subjectivity/objectivity

[bo198214]

This thread is branched from The problem with time travel as I see it

[moonlord]

I personally think there is no such thing as absolute subjectivity or absolute objectivity. For example, even when using methods of measuring different properties of the surrounding universe, one cannot be sure the METHOD is correct in it's essence.

As far as I know, all (or almost all) of the science is derived from a set of axioms or preset statements accepted as true. Therefore the laws describe a MODEL that is correct in relation with the initial axiomatic set. How can one be sure a model is correct? One cannot. As someone said, "It only takes a observation (as in 'by some method determing something') that does not fit in the theory (as in 'a scientific theory') to prove the theory is wrong. However, no matter the number of observations that confirm the theory, one cannot be sure the theory is correct (as in 'represents the reality').". One must PROVE it to be so. And how can one prove a theory describes the reality exactly, if the properties of this reality are determined using methods that are correct ONLY according to the theory in discussion?

I believe several interpretations of the 'thing out there' are possible. Examples include the particle/wave dualism and (in the hypothesis the holografic universe model is correct) the hologram and its generator on its side. Can one tell, whether 'out there' really exist particles or waves? One cannot.

It is also possible that none of the models describing the universe (as in 'everything that exists') is actually the REAL one. They might just interpret the reality.

Thigle might object, as to how does one know what actually IS real. I believe one does not. We might live in a world as the equations describe, or we might be in a 'Matrix'. How can one know that? I believe one cannot.

Thigle is subjective. Jinydu is objective. However, NEITHER of them is ABSOLUTELY subjective or objective. I believe these two notions are related, and yet incompatible.

[thigle]

moonlord: you misinterpret my expressions: just because i essentialy disagree with objectivistic methodologies, it does not mean i propose solipsistic subjectivity per se.

actually, i believe there IS such a thing as absolute subjectivity and absolute objectivity - for subjectivity and objectivity are just 2 faces of 2 headed Janus - 1 two-fold perceptual mechanism, working in unison, but taken usually as one or other, due to inability to embrace paradox and deal with it ultimately.
and, i found for myself, that essence of both is nothing. BOTH subjectivity and objectivity are grounded by the same groundlessness.

or... ideal(=whole) objectivism is archetypal(=total) subjectivity. both are INTERDEPENDENT and co-arising ! one holds the other in chiasmic intertwinning !

i stated n times that i am not a proponent of some 'subjectivism' ! godamn dualists are binary. if not this then the other. if not the other, then this. forever confused.
should i really label my approach at all, i would state: nonduality. or thigle.

let's make a simple experiment with your own experiencing process as its object :

in any experience (let's consider visual sphere of experience/mind for an exemple), attention is the phenomenal energy(in the sense of ability to do work) of the mind: in other words, where you direct attention, there the mind starts to work, to 'flourish'.

let's explore attention/energy in its front/back dimension as it is present in ordinary form of visual consciousness in terms of FOV forwards and 'feeled'(tangible invisible) behind. con.centrating on an object of visual consciousness, such as a vase, for exemple, brings about this experiential axis, representing the possible fullness of experiential scope(or gradient), spanning bothways:
a) forwardly, out into the ob.jective domain, where lies the possibility of ec.static perception, merging, or dissapearance into the object of concentration. this is the identification pole of the axis. the basic aim of any concetrative meditations (although not always explicitly) is to attain first this one-pointed concentration, stepping out of oneself right into the percept.
b) inwardly, this is awareness of being aware. the co-presence of perception and awareness of this perception. being aware of something as well as being aware of being aware of it.

now both extremes hold gates to where they start from: these 2 ends of this experiential axis are 2 sides of 1 point in infinity in projective visual perceptual space.

this allows to realise where BOTH these viewpoints(subjectivism, which is idealism anyway, and objectivism - which equals nihilism) stand at, as well as where they start from.

much deeper layers of psyche need to be taken into account if the wholeness of psyche is to be grasped by Self. subject/object division functions mainly in the ego-bound modality of Being.

it's not possible to understand 'the thing out there' as moonlord calls it, if 'the thing right here' is not first understood. epistemological & ontological is the same duality. how do we know how we know / what & how ultimately is (out there) ?

these questions start to fade once one starts do get under one.

Thigle might object, as to how does one know what actually IS real. I believe one does not. We might live in a world as the equations describe, or we might be in a 'Matrix'. How can one know that? I believe one cannot.

one can precisely because one cannot, you nihilist (this ain't flaming just discernment ). so you're right, in a restricted sense.

It is also possible that none of the models describing the universe (as in 'everything that exists') is actually the REAL one. They might just interpret the reality.

agreed. (by no-one , of course )

[moonlord]

I do not believe in God as in the religious approach (a superfluous ethereal entity that is everywhere and yet nowhere) but as a part of each Self. By taking decisions and assuming consequences, every one influences the world in some way. The Butterfly Effect (as in the Theory of Chaos) and Heisenberg's Principle make me think whether these influences are nedeterministic and somehow random. There is a movie, 'What the Bleep do We Know', and will be another one, 'What the Bleep - Down the Rabbit Hole' discussing this matter. I believe each one can greatly influence the Universe (as in 'all that exists'), but cannot foresee the consequences on long term. This is, i think, the main cause for the apparent chaos there is. When not taking decisions with an eye on the consequences emmerging, they will have random results on a large scale (rule of great numbers). Thus, the chaos.

Yes, I am a nihilist to a certain degree.

[bo198214]

You know a statement is true if the truth of that statement has somehow revealed itself to you

That means for me, you can only know something, if you have consciousness. But in the next sentence, you apply it to computer programs. So you assume implicitly they have consciousness?

But you could also say they know that "we told them this", and they know that "If all their input is correct, then their output is true".

A more common definition would be something like "if you believe it, and it's true, then you know it."

But it seems to me that you explain "knowledge" by "being true".
And "being true" has again to do with objectiveness. And observation also has to do with objectiveness.

We don't need to define "observation" and "feel". But we can assume that any entity can make an observation, but only a conscious entity can "feel" something.

No, I dont understand you. I agree that we dont need to define "feel" or "perceive" because these are kind of atom terms (though of course in psychological framework there is much more to say about). Every conscious one does it.
I dont understand how an entity without consciousness can make an observation.
How can a rock make an observation? Maybe there is some dissent about the word entity. I mean with entity nearly everything material.

Observation is a much more difficult term. Please have at least a look at the points in 'non-dimensional being & consciousness', so I dont need to repeat the ideas here. Observation is something that is many-objective (and as such an not at all basic term). I.e. if I say there is an eagle flying, then for nearly every seeing people this must be obvious. For example when a certain cloud appears to me immediately as a heavenly sheep, then I dont would call this an observation. On the other hand if I am in a group of people that perceive mostly in the same way as I, then this could be an observation. What I want to say: Observation is the most basic form of many-objective perception (for example to decide whether the needle is on north or not).

but I say "what if they don't?".

So observing is not a relation of a being and an event. But it depends on if nearly every being would perceive the event the same. So an observation would be "I heard the person screaming aloud". But it would not be an observation "I saw the person perceiving a flashing light". If I and my friend had invented a new language and he telled me in that language that he is very sad, then the observation is that the friend said something. But what he said was not observed by all the other people standing around.
If someone says, he feels pain and I see him smiling. What is the observation? With physics experiments all I have to do is read the instrument. This is a basic procedure most human can learn. Thathswhy physics is a very exact natural science. In biology the observertions (of for example behaviour) do much more depend on the observer thatswhy biology is by far not as exact as physics. And in mathematics no observation is necessary, thatswhy it is most exact.

But do you know that you were conscious 10 minutes ago? The only proof you have is a memory of feeling something 10 minutes ago. But for all you know, that memory could have been implanted there.

I have no answer regarding memory. I know at least that I am conscious in the moment.

Furthermore, if I could somehow extract your memory, you would have no more evidence for consciousness than I do. If you decide that a memory is sufficient evidence, then I can prove you are conscious.

I can not follow the last sentence. It seems to me that by 'extract' you mean, you can reexperience my past experiences and I cant do so anymore. But that was exactly the topic, whether you can objectively experience, what someone other experiences - the memory-chip as an objectified experience. So the last sentence sounds a bit tautological.

[bo198214]

But maybe we can summarize the statements that I simply dont accept asking people as a scientific method (for knowing about their perceptions).

[PWrong]

That means for me, you can only know something, if you have consciousness. But in the next sentence, you apply it to computer programs. So you assume implicitly they have consciousness?

I never said that. Knowledge is simply something that happens after you observe something. If you tell the computer that x=3, then the computer knows that x=3 in a particular context. There's no need for consciousness.

I dont understand how an entity without consciousness can make an observation.
How can a rock make an observation? Maybe there is some dissent about the word entity. I mean with entity nearly everything material.

I'm using observation as a strictly physical word here. Any entity can potentially make an observation, given the physical means to do so. So the rock can "see" if it has a camera built in to it. But it can't "feel" itself seeing, because it's not conscious.

Quote:
but I say "what if they don't?".

So observing is not a relation of a being and an event. But it depends on if nearly every being would perceive the event the same.

No it doesn't. Maybe it depends on this:
There could potentially exist at least one event, such that there could exist two beings that would percieve the even the same. Actually, it doesn't depend on that either. The important thing is that the information changes somewhere between being emmited, and being recieved. In your example, your sad friend's message gets translated into english before you recieve it.

So what happens if the information doesn't change? Only a single possible scenario is required to disprove the statement that "you can't observe another entities consciousness".

Observation is a much more difficult term.

Replace it with an easier word then.

If someone says, he feels pain and I see him smiling. What is the observation?

Your observation is that he is smiling. We've already assumed that you can't observe him feeling pain. My argument says that, if he can observe himself feeling pain, then so can I. If I can't, neither can he. So he doesn't know anything about his own consciousness.

I can not follow the last sentence. It seems to me that by 'extract' you mean, you can reexperience my past experiences and I cant do so anymore.

That's not what I mean. I'm just supposing I can learn the things that you have observed, without severely affecting your brain. It could be as simple as asking you a question with a lie-detector.

Maybe I should put some more detail into axiom 8 to make my logic more sound.

Axiom 8a. "feeling" implies consciousness.
Axiom 8b. "observation" does not neccessarily imply consciousness.
Axiom 8c. An entity can observe its own feelings.
Axiom 8d. An entity can observe the observations of another entity.
Axiom 8e. An entity can not observe the feelings of another entity.

We also require that "observe" is defined to satisfy the following properties:
Def 1a. If I observe that you observe X, then I observe X.
Def 1b. If I observe that X, and X implies Y, then I can observe Y.

Now, if both 8d and 8c are true, and "observe" is defined with the above property, then 8e is false. So:

Lemma. 8d and 8e implies not 8e.

Theorem. If all of 8 is true, except 8e, and 9 is true, then:
An entity can observe the consciousness of another entity.

This is the logical basis of my argument. So, if you still disagree with me, you should know exactly where my argument falls down (And I won't be surprised if it does).

[bo198214]

Sorry, PWrong, but I completely lack any intuition what you mean by observe. From the camera and computer example, I would suppose its something like physical memory or so. But then your observation is simply a material process. And I can see no difference to other material processes in this context. What makes a material process an observation? Is every change to an environment an observation (for the entity environment)?

Same with "information" and "knowledge" (I might have read, that you assume information and knowledge existing independent of consciousness). For me there is no information for a nonconscious entity. What for one is informative/understandable/knowledge-extending isnt for the other. So it depends on the subject.

I thought that I had half way understood you, and that my sentence about the accepting of asking as a scientific method, would answer your concerns. But now it seems to me that we spoke about completely different things.

I mean the original question was, whether it is scientificly decidable whether an entity feels something. Scientific means by (many-)objective methods, i.e. mainly observation (in my sense) and reasoning.

And I dont see what your observation term has to do with it. So perhaps you can explain what you regard as scientific/objective/truth/information/knowledge/observation to get a common basis (hopefully you agree that is not of much use to play with words that lack a common understanding).

[bo198214]

Today in the morning I had a glimpse what you could mean by observation and information. Whenever the change of something in entity A causes a change of something in entity B then there was information conveyed from B to A and we could say B observed that change in A.

Is it that? (Pleaaase say yes!)

It reminds me of a certain logic system, where the implications are only valid if indeed the precondition influences the conclusio. I.e. especially those trivial implications where the precondition is always false and the conclusio is always false are excluded (what is also more close to the intuitive understanding of if-then. "If the moon is a cheese then the earth is a disc" *g*).

*searching for references to that logic*

[moonlord]

[...] then there was information conveyed from B to A

I'd say information was conveyed from A to B. When you see a person crossing the street, you receive information as to the actions of the person without emmiting anything.

[bo198214]

oops, yes, thats what I meant ...

[PWrong]

Today in the morning I had a glimpse what you could mean by observation and information. Whenever the change of something in entity A causes a change of something in entity B then there was information conveyed from B to A and we could say B observed that change in

If you like. That's probably the simplest definition possible, and I think it would satisfy Def 1a and Def 1b. As I said, the exact definition of "observe" doesn't matter as long as you assume Def 1a and Def 1b.

[bo198214]

If you like.

What an expressive answer! So I interpret it as: "No thats not what I meant. But it seems as if it obeys my axioms, so continue".

As I said, the exact definition of "observe" doesn't matter as long as you assume Def 1a and Def 1b.

Indeed does it matter, when I have to decide whether I accept your axioms about it. And what I also said, that it does not help to show that a somethingx does somethingy, if somethingx and somethingy obey axioms x,y,z. If it should get meaning then the terms should be closely related to their common semantics.

As to this new definition of observation: Its clear that it is transitive if A observes B and B observes C then A observes C. So If you mean by "I" and "you" the corresponding material entities (and not the consciousnesses) then applies Def 1a. Already with 1b I disagree, when you mean imply in a logical way. So for example may be there are some experiments that support string theory, though not all implications can be observed due to too low energy accellerators. Its anyway the question what "imply" should mean with that definition of observation. What can a change imply? If you mean imply on a physical level. I.e. that every change is acompanied by a certain other change, then I also disagree. Because for example if every change in A is accompanied by an ultrasound. But B is only conceivable for normal sound, then B does not observe the accompanying ultra sound. (And maybe it was not necessary to divide into physical and logical implication.)

But thats not all. With the new definition of observation I also disagree with 8c. At a first place it are the wrong types. We spoke of observe for two material entities. And feeling is not a material entity or change. What seems to be the case is, that some feelings are accompanied by a specific physical change. But at least not every feeling is accompanied by a specific observable change (I say).

But that doesnt help us much, because thats the core of the discussion, how feelings and physical changes are interrelated. And I simply choose another axiom here than Jinydu would.

[PWrong]

Its anyway the question what "imply" should mean with that definition of observation. What can a change imply? If you mean imply on a physical level. I.e. that every change is acompanied by a certain other change, then I also disagree.

I meant "imply" in the same sense as in "feeling implies consciousness". In this case, the observation doesn't imply anything, the observed fact does.

With the new definition of observation I also disagree with 8c.

I would disagree with that too. It's part of one of the statements I set out to disprove in the first place: "you can observe your own feelings, but(and) I can't observe your feelings".

Overall, what I'm trying to do, is to prove this statement to be inconsistent:
"I can be sure of my own consciousness. But I can never be sure that you are conscious."
or equivalently:
"I can be sure of my own consciousness. But you can never be sure that I am conscious."

I hope we both understand what this statement means. If not, we can rewrite it with as different words as we like. It's not the words that matter, but the logic of the sentence. A proof is supposed to work regardless of details. That's why I don't really care about defining "observation".

Now to disprove the statement, I have to do two things.

1. Assume that I can be sure of my own consciousness. Then prove that I can be sure of your consciousness.
2. Assume that I can never be sure of your consciousness. Then prove that I can never be sure of my own consciousness.

Or equivalently:
1. Assume that I can be sure of my own consciousness. Then prove that you can be sure of my consciousness.
2. Assume that you can never be sure of my consciousness. Then prove that I can never be sure of my own consciousness.

But 2 is the Contrapositive of 1, so I really only have to prove 1.

I still think it's possible to prove this. My proof relies on the fact that the "evidence" for consciousness must move from my "undetectable" consciousness, to somewhere where it can, eventually, be detected. Now you might say that knowledge itself comes from the consciousness, so the evidence doesn't have to be detectable. But would that mean that knowledge can't be detected either? I'll have to think about this side of it some more.

[thigle]

(logical) implication equals (geometrical) containment.

[moonlord]

If I can be sure of my consciousness, then I am able to communicate this to you. How are you then sure what I said is true? I think the problem can be rewritten like this...

[PWrong]

If I can be sure of my consciousness, then I am able to communicate this to you. How are you then sure what I said is true? I think the problem can be rewritten like this...

Yes, that's the usual argument. But your conscious mind has to somehow tell your brain that you can be sure of your own consciousness. If I can't be sure that what I hear is true, can your brain be sure that what it hears is true? The process by which you can be sure of your own consciousness might be just as untrustworthy as any scientific method I use on you.

[moonlord]

I think it isn't necessary useful to separate conscious mind from the unconscious mind. Maybe it helps to consider the brain a single entity.

This question really made me think...

[thigle]

just dropping a few pebbles to ripple the mindpool...

conscious and unconscious minds are not one for a reason. though you got the point that conscious mind that considers not its shadows as its own puts unnecessary restraint on its access to unconscious (minds) - it cuts its back off (seemingly).

wellwood says " ...what is unconscious generally, are patterns of organismic structuring and relating, which function holistically as background of focal attention"

what really is unnecessary, is to try to explain wholeness(of experience) from its parts, interfaces, or aspects.

btw, you what scope of unconscious you meant ? personal or collective(social) layers as well ? or infinitely deep ?

Lacan says that to understand the structure of unconscious is to understand the languague (or vice versa? yep.)

then, there are these 2 chinese guys, walking by the pool with fish.
"how wonderful to be a fish"
"how could you now, you ain't fish"
"how can you know, you ain't me."
...

3 points stand for a line that was added by Baudrillard in his Perfect Crime,( i think, or maybe not, but usually i encountered this with just these three) that i forgot. maybe he could spare that one and replace the third with "i know it the same way that you don't know how i know. "

Dreyfus from Berkeley, on "Being and Power: Heidegger and Foucault" (check out his webpage):

At the heart of Heidegger's thought is the notion of being, and the same could be said of power in the works of Foucault. The history of being gives Heidegger a perspective from which to understand how in our modern world things have been turned into objects. Foucault transforms Heidegger's focus on things to a focus on selves and how they became subjects. And, just as Heidegger offers a history of being, culminating in the technological understanding of being, in order to help us understand and overcome our current way of dealing with things as objects and resources, Foucault analyzes several regimes of power, culminating in modern bio-power, in order to help us free ourselves from understanding ourselves as subjects. (italics and boldness added)

Longchenpa Rabjam ( quoted by Levin in Opening of the Vision, p250] "...The subject dealing with its object is like a dream: Although there is no duality of subject and object, ingrained tendencies [intentionalities] cause duality to appear. What is postulated by the intellect is nothing [meta-physically] self sufficient. - Know non-duality straight away..."

[moonlord]

I was reffering to personal unconsciousness, like all the little things brain performes to keep you alive and don't know about...

I was also reffering to personal consciousness. The way I'm trying to solve this problem is to neglect all except personal (un)consciousness, get to a conclusion, then adapt it to include everything else. Something like 'divide and conquer'.

[bo198214]

I meant "imply" in the same sense as in "feeling implies consciousness". In this case, the observation doesn't imply anything, the observed fact does.

Yes, and so I stated that I cannot necessarily observe all implications that an observed fact has. Hopefully you agree with this.

With the new definition of observation I also disagree with 8c.

I would disagree with that too. It's part of one of the statements I set out to disprove in the first place: "you can observe your own feelings, but(and) I can't observe your feelings".

Yes, but that is because you dont distinguish between the outside/objective and the inside/subjective view (and thatswhy probably they are both equivalent to you). The definition we worked out for you was regarding the objective view. The definition of observing I gave in the first place was regarding the subjective view. With the subjective one there is no doubt 8c being true (of course only if this entity is conscious).

"I can be sure of my own consciousness. But I can never be sure that you are conscious."

I hope we both understand what this statement means.

I think so.

But 2 is the Contrapositive of 1, so I really only have to prove 1.

Hey, we are both mathematicians ...
(but maybe its useful for the other reading people)

I still think it's possible to prove this.

Then do it! Thats what this thread makes interesting (for me).

The way I'm trying to solve this problem is to neglect all except personal (un)consciousness, get to a conclusion, then adapt it to include everything else.

Thats my approach too.

If I can be sure of my consciousness, then I am able to communicate this to you. How are you then sure what I said is true?

Yes, especially if you replace consciousness by concrete perceptions. You wouldnt believe a machine stating that it is conscious. But from a scientific standpoint you cant distinguish the machine from a human regarding having consciousness. So if the machine talks about her last lovesickness accompanied with certain currents in it ...

[moonlord]

I'm sorry, I can't follow the other thread. I just don't understand it.

[moonlord]

I disagree with axiom 8a. If a frog feels hungry, does it have to be conscious? (Well, according to my definition, yes)